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Environmental Ethics and Value
in the World
Many varieties of environmental ethics
rest on the idea that nature and nature's
creatures have value in themselves, value
independent of their potential use to human
beings. Plants and animals -- even whole
ecosystems -- are said to have intrinsic value --
value over and above whatever instrumental
value they may have in relation to human wants
and needs. Further, the intrinsic values in nature
are thought to exist independently not only of
the instrumental but of any human valuations
whatever. The intrinsic values in question are
really or objectively in the world; they are not
projections of our ways of valuing and
conceptualizing things onto a world that in itself
is value-inert. A truly adequate environmental
ethic requires realism about certain kinds of
value.
Unfortunately, serious problems afflict
this realism about value, as philosophers have
known at least since the 17th Century, and it is
not clear whether any of the leading varieties of
environmental ethics has succeeded in solving
them (or perhaps even faced them). One such
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problem is that the so-called objective values
seem not to be derivable from any facts, and not
reducible to them either, so that the values
appear not to be determined by anything about
which there clearly is a fact of the matter.
Another problem is that attributing value to a
thing seems to yield no empirically testable
prediction about it, and no explanation of its
behavior, beyond what we already know from
the relevant factual sciences. Hence many
conclude that the talk of intrinsic value or
"enchantment" in the world is groundless if not
obscurantist.
I am inclined to agree with much of this;
those who would reenchant the world may have
underestimated the challenge, which finds
expression in the question, "In a world of
scientific law, how can one speak of intrinsic
value?" Or as Morris Berman says, can those
who live in a scientific world "affirm intrinsic
meaning and value in the natural order? ... Is a
theology of nature compatible with natural
science?" Or must we conclude that
"disenchantment is [inherent in] the scientific
world view"? If so, we may have to give up
enchantment or give up science.
I think we can have both enchantment
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and science. But in order to see why we can
have both, it is necessary to understand just
what the challenge to us reenchanters is, why it
has been so nearly insurmountable, and wherein
previous efforts to meet the challenge may have
failed. Then we need some positive account of
just how those who live in a scientific world can
affirm, after all, intrinsic value. The argument
will be not merely that such reenchantment is
logically consistent with an austere scientific
naturalism, but that we may form a synthesis ()f
the two, a synthesis in which each enriches the
other while correcting the other's occasional
extremes.
The first step toward reenchanting the
world is to get values back into it. So long as
values are merely the projections of our desires
or schemes onto a normatively inert world, or
merely our internal response to causal
stimulation by the world, we cannot affirm the
needed intrinsic value in the natural order, and
the world cannot be said, in the intended,
objective sense, to contain an element of value.
So let's reflect awhile on how the values
disappeared from the world in the first place.
They disappeared in the 17th century, or
at least were well on the way to disappearing,
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when the world began to be identified with what
could be expressed in the language of natural
science. Since no value judgment is derivable
from or reducible to such language, or so it
came to seem, it looked as though the world
could contain no telos, no purposes or proper
functions. Instead, the world was nothing but
the objective world of matter in motion.
Descartes's mechanism displaced Aristotle's
teleology. Indeed all kinds of value seemed
banished from nature, along with much else that
we cherish. All efforts to get the values back in
have appeared unconvincing, evidently because
it has seemed that, as Huston Smith once put it,
"any objective description of the world would
have to be value-free." Indeed no such effort
can possibly succeed, so long as the world is
identified with the totality of objective
descriptive fact, and the only sense in which the
world could contain or manifest an element of
v;\lue is by way of derivability from such fact.
What underlies this history is a set of
assumptions and inferences that add up to what
J. L. Mackie calls "the argument from
queerness": objective values would have to be
very queer sorts of things, because their relation
with facts is so mysterious, being a matter
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neither of logical derivation, nor of reduction or
definability, nor even of supervenience. Better
by far to replace the alleged objective values
with some sort of subjective response that can
be causally related to stimulation by the natural
features on which the alleged values are said to
be resultant or consequential. Or so the
argument goes.
Mackie himself explains why the
argument from queerness is indispensable.
Without some such argument, the mere fact of
widespread normative disagreement does not by
itself imply there are no objective values about
which to disagree, no more than disagreement in
science implies there really is no truth of the
matter there. Or as Robert Nozick remarks, "It
is because we do not see how an objective ethics
is possible that we worry about irresolvable
[normative] disagreements." And as Nicholas
Sturgeon argues, anyone who finds it plausible
that objective values play no explanatory role in
our account of the world must already have been
persuaded by some other consideration that there
are in the first place no objective values to play
the role. Indeed if anything, the presumption
should be that there are objective values. For
this is what ordinary usage of normative terms
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overwhelmingly presupposes, as does most of
our actual normative reasoning, including those
of our explanations that appeal to moral
properties (as in 'Hitler's depravity explains his
universal condemnation'). Hence as Mackie
sees, subjectivists like himself are compelled to
advance an error thesis: our ordinary usage and
reasoning, entrenched for millennia, are
massively in error, for there really are no
objective values. And Mackie is far more
candid than most subjectivists in acknowledging
that the burden of proof is on those who
advance any such thesis. The argument from
queerness is meant to discharge this burden.
It follows that if we can undermine the
argument from queerness, by showing the falsity
of one of its assumptions, then not only is the
presumption that there are objective values
undefeated, we are free to treat ordinary usage
and normative reasoning and explanation as
significant independent evidence against
subjectivism. If we can undermine the argument
from queerness, by showing how objective value
is possible, we need not worry so deeply about
irresolvable normative disagreements and the
occasional seeming irrelevance or impotence of
normative explanations of various admitted facts.
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Without the argument from queerness, or
something very like it, subjectivism has little to
be said for it.
The way to undermine the argument from
queerness is to show that there is an alternative
to the relations it lists as the only possible
relations between facts and values. The unlisted
relation is nonreductive determination. That is,
even if values are not related to facts by some
sort of logical derivation or reduction, still they
might be related by nonreductive determination.
But what precisely is this relation of
nonreductive determination? When we say one
thing determines another, we mean that given
the way the first is, there is only one way the
second can be. Here is a concrete example.
The function of your heart is to pump blood;
pumping blood is what the heart is supposed to
do, but may fail to do, one of its shoulds or
oughts. What determines that this is the
normative function of the heart its
teleofunction, as it is called? According to a
leading theory of the matter, the teleofunction of
the heart is to pump blood because it was by
pumping blood that past hearts (or enough of
them) enabled containing organisms to survive
and reproduce at rates higher than those without
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them, this prior successful performance thereby
enabling the production of today's hearts. The
trait selected for was one responsible for a
mechanism that pumps, and your heart has the
function of pumping blood -- it is supposed to
pump blood -- in virtue of being a descendant in
a "reproductively established family" of items
in which a critical proportion of ancestors
performed that function, your heart having been
produced in significant part because often
enough they did. The proportion of ancestor
devices that performed successfully can
sometimes be tiny; in this sense the devices can
be quite unreliable yet contribute just enough to
enable survival and reproduction. Hardly any of
the seeds of the wild fig in its jungle habitat
manage to start new trees; the seeds are nearly
all consumed by animals, insects or other
mishap. Nonetheless, they have the function of
starting new trees.1
What determines what your heart is
supposed to do is a natural-selective history of
relations to an environment, a history in which
your heart is a late arrival. It is not determined
by a mechanism. To make this vivid, suppose
that by some cosmic accident a collection of
molecules hitherto in random motion were to
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coalesce to form an exact physical duplicate of
your heart, the same down to the last
microparticle. Or imagine the duplicate
achieved by some prodigious feat of technology
(beam me up my heart-copy, Scotty). Because
the history of the duplicate is wrong -- it is not
a descendant, not in the family -- it would not
be a heart (it would not be a member of the
biological kind "heart"), even though it would
of course have all the physical powers and
dispositions of your heart. What determines
whether an object has the normative function is
the natural-selective historical matter of being a
descendant in a reproductively established
family of objects in which a critical proportion
of ancestors pumped blood. It is not determined
by the physical states of the object alone, or by
the physical structure or dispositions of the
particles that compose it, but only by the
relevant natural-selective history.
The point is fundamental, recurring all
the way down to the molecular level. Certain
sequences of amino-acid molecules, called signal
sequences, have the teleofunction of acting as
precursors to certain proteins and mediating
where they go when fully synthesized -- some to
the mitochondria, some to the plasma
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membrane, some to the chloroplasts, and so on.2
The trait of being a signal sequence is a function
trait, a matter of what the sequences of amino-
acid molecules are supposed to do but may fail
to do, depending in part on what is happening
elsewhere in the cell. Whether a sequence of
molecules is a signal sequence is not determined
by the physical structure or dispositions of the
particles that compose the sequence, but only by
the relevant natural-selective history.
So we see illustrated in biology how
there is an intelligible alternative to the relations
listed in the argument from queerness, which
underlies the widespread suspicion of
normativity from the 17th century on. The
normative function of your heart is not derivable
from or reducible to its physical properties; the
mechanists were right about this. What the
mechanists did not see, and still do not, is that
normative function is nonreductively determined
by a natural-selective history of relations to a
wider environment. This undermines the
argument from queerness -- provided certain
familiar objections can be met which we will
consider in a moment.
But first recall the consequences of
undermining the argument from queerness .
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Once the argument is undermined, not only is
the presumption of objectivity undefeated, we
are free to treat various facts about actual
normative reasoning and other usage of
normative language, including the explanatory,
as significant independent evidence against
subjectivism. For without some such argument
as the one from queerness, the mere fact of
normative disagreement does not imply there are
no objective values about which to disagree, and
subjectivists have no way of discharging the
burden of proving their error thesis (that our
normal normative reasoning and usage,
entrenched for millennia, are massively in error).
Now for the objections. Someone might
object that a thing's having a certain
teleofunction yields no prediction of its
behavior. After all, that the heart's teleofunction
is to pump blood does not by itself imply that a
given heart will pump blood; a particular heart
may be so deformed, diseased or damaged as to
be totally incapable of doing so. Nor does a
thing x's having a certain function F imply even
that there is a substantial probability x will
perform F; remember all those fig seeds. But,
the objection continues, empirical science must
yield testable predictions; since attributing
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teleofunction does not, talk of teleofunction is
insufficiently empirical.
The problem with this objection is that
biologists typically are interested in how a thing
would behave if it were functioning normally
and in conditions for which it was designed
(where both the notion of normality and of
design are given the natural-selective account
sketched above). To attribute to the heart the
function of pumping blood, then, is among other
things to predict how it would behave if it were
behaving normally and under design conditions.
A related objection is that attributing
function does no explanatory work. After all,
saying that x is supposed to F explains neither
x's actual behavior (since as seen nothing
follows about x's actual behavior from x's being
supposed to F), nor the behavior of other things
causally affected by x (for the same reason).
The trouble with this objection is that attributing
F does do explanatory work, as follows.
Biologists typically are interested in what causal
effects x would have if x were functioning
normally and under design conditions. To
attribute to the heart the teleofunction of
pumping blood, then, is to give a causal
explanation of the behavior of those things
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affected by the heart assuming it is functioning
normally and under design conditions.
At this point many people will be
tempted, irresistibly, to raise a number of
traditional objections to equating normativity
with any descriptive affair whatever. One such
objection is the open question argument.
According to the open-question argument against
utilitarianism, for example, utilitarians propose
equating moral goodness with conduciveness to
the greatest happiness of the greatest number; in
every conceptually possible world, x is morally
good iff x conduces to the greatest happiness of
the greatest number. But, the argument
continues, we can easily imagine ourselves both
recognizing that some act or policy x conduces
to the greatest happiness of the greatest number,
and yet also wondering whether x is morally
good. Therefore, the two traits cannot be
equivalent after all (or at least it is an open
question whether they are). That is, open-
question arguments infer from the imaginability
of a certain situation to its conceptual
possibility, or at least to there being a
conceptually possible world in which the
relevant conditions obtain but the proposed
equivalence does not.
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But consider: What the theory of
teleofunctional normativity presents is not an
analysis of normativity in general or of the
normative trait N in particular (whether the
analysis is of a concept, ordinary usage, correct
usage, our intuitions, or phenomenology). The
theory presents this no more than Einstein's
theory of mass presents an anal ysis of the
ordinary concept of mass, or even of a
physicists' concept. Objections to the effect that
no one ever meant anything like this natural-
selective historical business when they spoke of
shoulds and oughts even basic biological
shoulds and oughts are as misguided as
objections to Einstein that no one ever meant by
'mass' anything not conserved in all interactions.
To require that an Einstein proceed by giving
analyses of existing concepts or established
usage (in or out of physics), or at least that he
not use terms fundamentally at odds with such
usage, would block his revisionary theory of
mass, and indeed a host of other revisionary if
not revolutionary theories in or out of the
sciences.
It follows that given a theoretical term
like 'mass' -- or theoretical normative terms like
'teleofunction' and 'supposed to pump blood' --
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the relation between the tenn and what defines
or explains it is not a relation of conceptually
necessary equivalence, not even broadly logical
or metaphysical equivalence; it is not meant to
hold in every metaphysically possible world, let
alone in every world we can imagine or
conceive. The claim is only that the equivalence
holds in the physically possible worlds (those in
which the objects obey the laws of physics), or
else in a subset of the physically possible
worlds; what happens in the rest is left open.
For example, so far as the empirical evidence
for the theory of teleofunction allows us to say,
the equivalence of 'is supposed to pump blood'
and 'occurs in a natural-selective reproductive
history having such-and-such physical
characteristics' is true in the subset of physically
possible worlds in which conditions obtain that
are necessary for there to be natural-selective
reproductive histories (or more narrowly, for
certain kinds of them; such conditions include
sufficient stability in the reproductive "stuff'
for it to reproduce, sufficient stability in the
environment for favorable adaptation to get a
grip, and so on; all bets are off in physically
possible worlds that are too chaotic, too hot,
whatever).
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This claim only of equivalence in subsets
of physically possible worlds disarms open-
question arguments against equivalence of a
normative trait with some descriptive or physical
trait. Open-question arguments mayor may not
be effective against utilitarianism. But they fail
spectacularly against theoretical equivalences
meant only to hold in subsets of the physically
possible worlds. Even if the mere imaginability
of a situation entails its conceptual possibility (it
may well not), nothing follows as to the
situation's physical possibility. Our armchair
intuitions are notoriously poor indicators of
physical possibility (that is, of what the laws of
physics actually allow). So too are our armchair
concepts. Nothing follows as to the physical
possibility of a situation from its conceptual
possibility, or even from the conceptual
possibility of its physical possibility.
Another traditional objection to any
equivalence of normativity with some
descriptive affair is that no ought can be
logically derived from any is. This too is not
even to the point, which is not that a basic
normative teleofunctional trait can be derived
from the descriptive matter of occurring in a
natural-selective reproductive history having
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such-and-such physical characteristics. The
point, rather, is that by assuming the equivalence
of the two in a subset of the physically possible
worlds, we are enabled to construct an
empirically adequate theory of teleofunction and
of much else.
Still another objection has to do with
identity. If N = E, the objection goes, then
necessarily N = E; N = E in every logically
possible world. So if for some x we can
imagine that Ex but not Nx, then N ;II! E after all.
'Trouble is, the theory of normative
teleofunctional traits does not claim anything so
strong as identity. All it claims is equivalence
of Nand E in a subset of the physically possible
worlds, which hardly guarantees identity.
Further, even if identity were claimed, it could
be contingent identity; that N = E would not
entail that N = E in every logically possible
world, or even in every physically possible
world. Finally, it's not at all clear that the
present E -- the descriptive matter of occurring
in a natural-selective reproductive history having
such-and-such physical characteristics -- is a
genuine physical property of x in the first place.
On some notions of genuine physical
propertyhood it is not. Unless they can be
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excluded, we should not glibly assume that E is
a genuine property of x, or even a genuine
relational property of x. True, what determines
whether x has N is a descriptive matter
involving x. But it does not follow that whether
x has N is determined by a descriptive property
of x, even a relational property of x. In fact
there are cases in which x's having N is
determined not by x's own physical properties
and relations, but only by these together with the
physical properties of some item y that bears no
physical relation to x that does any work in
determining N.
Suppose, in light of the discussion so far,
we are entitled to construe the most basic kind
of normativity as equivalent to a teleofunctional
property N that x has when x is a member of a
first-order reproductively established family
which proliferated, survived and enabled the
production of x because a critical proportion of
x's ancestors performed N. This may seem a
very long way from intrinsic values of the kind
that environmental ethicists require. How do we
get from basic, teleo functional normativity to
intrinsic values?
In a crucial sense we already have them.
Environmental ethicists want intrinsic value in
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the sense at least of value in nature that exists
independently of any potential use to humans,
value over and above any instrumental value
something may have in relation to human wants
and needs. And teleofunctional values are
intrinsic in this sense. For example, whether the
spotted owl's heart is supposed to pump blood -
- whether this is what it should do -- is
determined by a natural selective history quite
independent of human wants and needs. So too
for the teleofunctional values of indefinitely
many other species and their organs, behaviors
and more.
But let's see if we can go further. Start
by thinking about rules, and about behavior that
is supposed to conform to a rule. Consider the
honey bee, and suppose we want to understand
the role of bee dances in the life of the hive,
which role, biologists theorize, contributed to the
evolutionary success of the bees. Careful
observation and experiment reveal that the dance
is a complex that consists not only of wing
beats, steps and waggles having specific
frequencies and orientations, but of bits of nectar
and pollen that adhere to the dancing forager
bees and tell the waiting bees about the kind and
quality of nectar to expect at a certain distance
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and direction.3 That is, dance-complex
variations map onto specific combinations of
direction, distance, kind and quantity of nectar,
the mapping being a necessary causal factor in
the waiting bees' being enabled to find the
nectar (or to find this nectar rather than some
lower in quality or quantity). This in tum
provides significant support for the hypothesis
that past dance complexes which did map were
selected for (or rather that the mechanisms
which produced them in appropriate conditions,
often enough, were selected for, or at least the
genotypes responsible for these mechanisms).
Granted the hypothesis, and given the natural-
selective theory of proper function, one of the
proper functions of the complexes is to map
onto direction, distance, kind and quantity of
nectar.
Now think of the inward-bound bee-
dance rule. For vividness, let's say the rule is,
"When nectar occurs at such-and-such direction
and distance, dance Opus II, no. 4." For the
outward-bound bees, the rule to which their
behavior is to conform is, "When they dance
Opus II, no. 4, fly such-and-such direction and
distance." (Of course the actual rules are far
more complex.) That there are such rules, and
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which ones there are, are objective matters we
discover empirically, by discovering what is the
rule conformity to which, by a critical
proportion of ancestor behaviors, explains how
past bees -- or enough of them -- managed to
find nectar and proliferate. The rules discovered
in this way represent unexpressed purposes the
behavior has, indeed purposes of which the
organism need not, and typically could not be
aware, and which are not to be found by peering
into its head. Instead, to say that the organism
has such a purpose is to say that it "has within
[it] a genetically determined mechanism of a
kind that historically proliferated [among the
organism's ancestors] in part because it was
responsible for producing conformity to the ...
rule.,,4
Some rules have to do with repeated
interactions among organisms, whether
conspecific or alien. In many cases the
encounters are dangerous for one or both parties
-- eat or be eaten, fight or flee, fight or stand
off, exploit or cooperate. Often the history of
encounter amounts to an iterated prisoner's
dilemma. For the sake of simplicity, suppose
the rule of encounter conformity to which best
promotes the organism's fitness (or perhaps its
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genes') is the Tit-for-Tat rule: cooperate at the
first encounter, thereafter do whatever the other
did in the previous encounter. (There are
important cases where other rules do better/ In
the relevant encounter situations, what the
organism is supposed to do -- what it should or
ought to do -- is behave in conformity to the
Tit-for-Tat rule. Call this "ought" a proto-
moral ought. In the relevant encounter
situations, behavior in conformity to the Tit-for-
Tat rule has the property of being proto-morally
obligatory; behavior contrary to the rule is
proto-morally wrong. And we may say that the
organisms with which the given organism should
cooperate enjoys a corresponding proto-moral
considerabili ty.
Now many organisms are designed to
learn. This means that instead of coming wired
by evolution to be predisposed to behave (often
enough) in accordance with the Tit-for-Tat rule,
or with some other proto-moral rule(s), they may
learn so to behave (or to be so disposed) and to
pass on what they learn to their offspring.6
"What an organism does in accordance with
evolutionary design can be very novel and
surprising, for the more complex of nature's
creatures can learn."? They can acquire
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biological purposes -- things they are supposed
to do -- "that are peculiar to them as
individuals, tailored to their own peculiar
circumstances and histories."s In this kind of
case, a proto-moral property may be
nonreductively determined not by a natural-
selective reproductive history having such-and-
such physical characteristics, but only by such a
history together with the relevant novel features
to which the proto-moral rule is to apply.
For example, consider another proto-
moral rule, the Limited Altruism rule: Behave
altruistically toward kin (say toward those whose
genes are sufficiently like yours). Upon the
birth of your first child -- call her Sarah -- it's
clear that in order to conform to the Limited
Altruism rule, you have to conform to the rule,
"Behave altruistically toward Sarah." This is
what is called a derived rule, and you learn a
new competence -- to behave altruistically
toward Sarah -- in order to conform to it.
Because Sarah is unique -- never before has this
individual existed, and never again -- you
acquire a proto-moral duty that is new under the
sun: Love Sarah. And Sarah acquires a
corresponding kind of proto-moral
considerability.
The normativity here is a case of adapted
teleofunction.9 Your being supposed to love
Sarah is a matter not of something's being a
member of a reproductively established family
having the appropriate natural-selective history,
but only of this together with the relevant novel
feature -- the new-born Sarah to whom the
proto-moral rule is to apply. The normativity is
therefore a kind of non-basic normativity. The
normative teleofunction of being supposed to
love Sarah is derived from the teleofunction of
those genetically produced devices in us that
historically proliferated in part because they
were responsible for producing conformity
(often enough) to the proto-moral Limited
Altruism rule. And as before, the normativity
here is proof against the traditional objections to
objective normativity.
Note that in an important sense, this
imperative to love Sarah is categorical. The rule
commands you to love Sarah, period. It says
nothing about any of your desired ends, such as
happiness, nor does it condition the love on any
other motive you may have (or on Sarah's
behavior). On the other hand, the normativity is
derived from that of the devices in us that
historically proliferated in part because they
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produced conformity (often enough) to the
Umited Altruism rule. In this sense, though
only in this sense, the normativity of the rule --
its imperative force -- is not independent of all
facts about human nature or circumstance. If a
categorical imperative must be independent of
all such facts, then of course the imperative to
love Sarah is hypothetical only. But why should
anyone insist on such miserably Draconian
categorical ness in the first place? Better to say
that the imperative to love Sarah is categorical,
in that the imperative is not conditioned on any
motive you may have.
To pave the way for another and still
richer kind of non-basic normativity, note that
human beings are designed not only to learn but
to speak and listen, and that among our language
devices are conventional introducing-devices
such as "I christen thee ," "Let us call
such-and-such ," "Let the rule be pawn
can take en passant," and so on. Humans are
able not only to conform to rules -- quite
primitive creatures can do that -- but to express
the rules and make up new ones. Conventional
introducing-devices have a relational stabilizing
function such that, given something to fill the
blank, and given the appropriate context, they
acquire an adapted function to cause what fills
the blank to perform a certain function (of being
the name of the christened infant, of being a rule
for the pawn, etc.). Performance of this latter
function is then a derived teleofunction of the
words in the blank -- derived from the function
of the introducing device. (Often it will not
long remain a derived teleo function. As soon as
the words are used and continue to be used in
part because using them in this way works for
partner hearers and speakers, the words acquire
a direct teleofunction. So too for the newly
coined rules they may express.)lO
Now suppose it occurs to some especially
thoughtful tribal member that the Limited
Altruism rule should be supplemented by
Unlimited Altruism: Be altruistic to everyone,
not just kin or members of your tribe or nation;
love one another, regardless. The normativity
here is non-basic, clearly. Indeed 'Love one
another' is a fully moral rule, not proto-moral,
and the imperative it expresses, like the
imperative to love Sarah, is categorical. Yet its
normativity, like proto-moral normativity, is a
species of teleofunctional normativity. Why?
Basically because, despite the rule's being
completely new under the sun, its discovery,
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enunciation, and the competence to conform to
it are straightforward applications of capacities
that have robust teleofunctions, so that the
function of the rule is derived from the
teleofunctions of the devices that produced it
and the ability to conform to it. In this sense,
fully moral normativity is a species of
teleofunctional normativity, just as adapted
proper function is a species of proper function.
And as before, the traditional objections to the
normativity fail.
Taking now a further leap, suppose
someone concludes that all living things, not just
humans, should be, if not altruistic toward all
species, then at least disposed to give significant
weight to their interests. Hunter-gatherers have
seen that failure to do so leads in the not so
long run to environmental degradation
destructive to all. Suppose further that the rule
the hunter-gathers thus express in language --
and in ritual -- and bring to consciousness, is in
fact a rule to which all organisms should
conform, and indeed, except for humans, they
have within them genetically determined
mechanisms of a kind that historically
proliferated (among the organisms' ancestors) in
part because they were responsible for
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producing, often enough, conformity to the rule.
Then we could say that every organism
whatever, sentient or not, has a corresponding
moral considerability.
Further, this moral considerability would
be intrinsic, in the sense that it is not derived
from human wants or needs, and not grounded
in human conventions. It would not be the
result of expanding the domain of beings having
moral standing from a basis in human being.
Rather, it would be grounded in nature,
independently of human valuation. The moral
considerability of all creatures would not be a
mere projection of our ways of valuing and
conceptualizing things. This may not be all that
is necessary to reenchant the world, but it is a
significant step in the right direction.
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NOTES
1. The detailed theory of proper function behind
this sketch, as well as the definition of
"reproductively established family," occurs in
Millikan (1984), Chs. 1-2, and Millikan (1993b),
passim.
2. The example is from Kincaid (1990), who
develops it in greater detail (though to a
different end).
3. Kirchner and Towne (1994) provide an
accessible introduction with references. None of
this is to suggest that the bee dances form a
language. Cf. Millikan (1984), 40ff, 96-97;
Wenner (1990).
4. Millikan (1993a), 219. Cf. Millikan (1990);
Post (1991), 49-55.
5. Cf. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981); Axelrod
(1984); Axelrod and Dion (1988); Kitcher
(1993), which contains further references.
6. Indeed some of them may learn what Dennett
calls a Good Trick -- a behavioral talent that
enhances their chances dramatically -- which
when combined with the Baldwin Effect can
reflect back on and accelerate the process of
genetic evolution. Cf. Dennett (1991), 184 ff.
7. Millikan (1989), 292.
8. Millikan (1993a), 226.
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9. Millikan (1984), 40f.
10. Millikan (1984), 81-82.
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